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Abstract
The Basel  1988 Capital Accord is arguably the most  given by the standardized  approach.  Powell  argues that
successful of all  recent  financial "standards."  Although  it  the more detailed and specific the proposals  are for GIO
was designed  for internationally active banks in G10  internationally active banks,  the  less relevant the
countries,  more than  100 countries claim to adhere to it,  proposals will be for non-Gl0 countries that wish to
and many  apply  the Accord to all banks.  Significant  implement  the new Accord  for all banks.  Indeed,  many
changes  to this Accord  are currently under  discussion.  emerging countries will implement the 'standardized'
Powell  reviews the  current proposals  (published  in  approach, in which case,  given the limited universe of
January  2001)  from  the standpoint of an  emerging  rated  risks, little will change. Alternatively,  emerging
market.  He then addresses  how implementation  in G10  countries  will attempt to implement an IRB  approach,
countries  will affect the cost of capital  to emerging  but with significant problems implementing  and
economies.  The new proposals  make considerable  calibrating  the parameters-or  inappropriate  use of G1 0
advances  in  linking risk and regulatory capital  for  calibrations.  At the same time, banks in emerging
internationally  active banks,  especially  for their  economies  remain the most important  vehicle  for
corporate loan book.  But the corporate-calibrated  financial  intermediation and the appropriate  regulation
internal  ratings-based  (IRB)  approach leads to significant  of bank  capital one  of the most important  issues for
changes  in capital  requirements  and spreads  for banks  financial sectors.  Powell suggests  that additional
that lend to emerging countries.  The author proposes  alternatives  should be included or,  failing that, the  time
that for sovereign  lending, banks should develop  internal  may  have come specifically  for an Accord  for emerging
ratings according to  an S&P or Moody's scale,  and  economies.
capital charges  be  levied at the corresponding weights
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The Basel  1988 Accord is perhaps the best example of a highly successful
financial  'standard'2 . Although developed by a committee representing
G10 bank supervisors (the Basel Committee of Banking  Supervisors -
BCBS),  and designed with the explicit objective of being applicable to a
group of 'internationally  active banks'  it has been applied voluntarily in
more than  100 countries and in many of those countries  it is applied to all
banks and not just those that are intemationally  active3.
The success of this standard is particularly important  in emerging
economies.  Arguably,  in that context the objective of ensuring  a safe and
sound banking system remains more important that that of establishing  a
'level playing field' across  countries.  The  1988 Accord clearly had both of
these aspects in mind and the approach  is,  on the one hand, flexible enough
to be adapted to different country characteristics,  while on the other hand
creating a reasonable yardstick ('assets at risk') to compare the levels of
capital of different banking systems.
It is easy to criticize the specifics of the 1988 Accord or an over-reliance  on
such yardsticks.  Any simple fornula for comparing levels of capital across
complex banks let alone across  countries will be subject to criticism.  The
1988 Accord created certain incentives for regulatory  arbitrage.  But
virtually any simple treatment of credit risk is bound to create  such
problems.  However,  the power of the  1988 Accord is precisely due to its
relative simplicity.  The  simple standard brought about a type of yardstick
competition or peer group pressure to modernize banking regulations
across emerging economies based on simple rules4. It is noticeable, for
instance, that although the BCBS recommended  a minimum ratio of 8% of
capital to assets at risk, most emerging economies that applied the Accord
chose to introduce the methodology with stricter limits.  It is this second set
of incentives that has been of over-whelming  importance in emerging
economies and made the 'standard'  such a success.
2 See the Financial  Stability Forum website (-fstbrum  grg) for information and numerous  examples
of financial standards.  The other candidate for the most successful financial  standard is without question
the SDDS created  by the IMF.  However, arguably this  is less voluntarv in nature
3.  See Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)  and for other aseful information  and a description of a new
comparative  database regarding the regulation and supervision of banks.
4This argument is sometimes explicit and always implicit  in the recent  efforts by the international
community to create 'standards'  - again see information from the Financial Stability Forum.
3Having said that, it is precisely some of the specific criticisms regarding the
1988 Accord and, in particular,  the way in which different risks are
converted into different capital requirements that has motivated a set of
quite fundamental proposed changes to the Accord.  An initial proposal
was published in June 1999 and, after comments,  subsequently a second
and much more detailed proposal was published in January  2001 for
comments by the end of May 2001.  The BCBS plans to publish a final
version around the end of the year with a final version to be published in
2002 and implementation  by 2005.  Under the current proposals this new
Accord has significant implications for emerging economies.
In this paper,  I first review some salient features of the January 2001
proposals from an emerging economy perspective.  The proposals  are
comprehensive  covering many hundreds of pages and three main pillars
(capital requirements,  supervisory responsibilities  and market discipline)
and several more specific  issues (e.g.:  operational risk and asset
securitization).  Moreover, within Pillar 1, three alternative  approaches
(standardized,  internal ratings foundation and internal ratings advanced) are
developed.  The discussion in this paper is then by necessity highly
selective.
In section 2, I provide a very brief guide to the new Accord from the
perspective of emerging economies  focusing on the central issue of capital
requirements (Pillar 1) and the alternatives  of a standardized  versus an
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach.  There are two broad ways in
which these new proposals will affect emerging economies.  First, through
its effect on the cost of capital from GIO+ regulated banks and secondly,
through the local implementation of the proposals in emerging  countries  -
- assuming that this happens.
In section three, I discuss the potential effects of these proposals on the cost
of capital for emerging economies.  There has been much discussion on the
standardized approach.  Specifically,  this discussion has centred on the
proposed use of external ratings and the potential pro-cyclicality of capital
requirements  - normally under the assumption that the rating industry
works well.  It is suggested here that this is just one issue but a potentially
more serious one is the industrial structure  and performance of the rating
industry itself  I suggest that for sovereign claims,  an internal rating (IRB)
approach might be more appropriate than an approach that relies on
external ratings.  However, I then develop estimates for the effects on
required capital and spreads for BIS reporting banks lending to emerging
economies that show that,  as calibrated, the IRB approach leads to
significantly higher capital requirements  for lower rated sovereigns.  This
4calibration stems from corporate  default experience  and it is suggested that
considerable  further elaboration of the IRB approach may be required for
the treatment of sovereign  risk.
In the subsequent  section I then discuss certain issues with respect to the
implementation of the new proposals within emerging economies.  The
overall  conclusion is that the internal rating  approaches  will be difficult to
implement and the way these approaches have been calibrated appear to be
inappropriate  to emerging economies.  Most emerging economies will
probably implement the standardized approach.  However,  in this case
much of the effort of the BCBS in revising the Accord may have little
relevance.  The small universe of rated corporations  in emerging  countries
implies that there will be very little change,  and the same problems that
S5. existed under the 1988 Accord will persist
In the fifth section, I then suggest that a further alternative is required.  This
alternative might be seen as intermediate between the standardized
approach and the IRB approach.  The idea would be that banks should
'rate'  borrowers but according  to a scale determined by the regulator.  The
'rating' would then feed through to a capital requirement.  To a significant
extent this approach might mirror and build on existing policies in some
countries that feed off credit registry information and are typically
employed to fix provisioning requirements.  It is suggested that such
policies, with some adaptation,  could also be employed to fix
complementary  mninimum capital requirements.  Section six concludes.
2.  A short introduction to the proposed new Capital Accord:  an
emerging economy  perspective
The January 2001 proposals to reform the 1988 Capital Accord comprise a
comprehensive  package that go well beyond simply capital requirements
for banks.  The package includes a) an overview paper,  b) the proposed
new Accord itself (which covers the three pillars of requirements,
supervisory review and market discipline) and  a set of supporting
documents  on diverse themes and in varying degrees of detail and
completeness6. In this short description I will concentrate on Pillar I  -
actual requirements.
5
6These include documents  on a) the  standardized  approach, b) the internal  ratings based approach c)  asset
securitization  d) operational  risk e) Pillar 2 (supervisory review)  f) principals for the management of
interest rate risk and g) Pillar 3 (market discipline).
5On levels  of consolidation
A first significant change with respect to the Accord of 1988 is related to
the level of consolidation under which consolidated supervision should take
place.  In the new proposals consolidation  is to start at the level of a bank
holding company where the principal activity of the holding is banking
rather than from the level of the bank itself (as in the  1988 Accord).  This
change implies that banking  supervisors will be required to consolidate
different types of companies that belong to the same holding company as a
banking group even if they are not formally subsidiaries of the bank itself.
On balance this change is to be welcomed.  The motivation stems from the
possibility under the previous regime of regulatory  arbitrage  across
financial groups with different supervisory rules reducing the overall level
of capital and hence solvency of the diversified financial  group.  At the
same time it should be remembered that several emerging countries are yet
to include consolidated  supervision in their respective  legislations.  This
change then opens the breach between the level of consolidation required in
GIO countries and the actual degree of consolidation employed in practice
by many emerging economy supervisors.  Consolidated supervision is also
a requirement of the Basel Core Principals and it is important to underline
the fact that I am not suggesting here that this should be removed  as an
objective.  It is a very important objective  and moreover the proposed
change in the level of the consolidation is also to be welcomed.  The point
here is that it is unrealistic to expect many emerging economies that have
not yet accepted  basic consolidated supervision to be able to fully
implement this new level of consolidation  rapidly.  The recent
postponement of the deadline from 2004 to 2005 is then to be welcomed
although this may still imply difficulties in some jurisdictions'.
On related lending
There are also new rules suggested in this proposal regarding  'related
lending'.  In the 1988 Accord there were no specific rules on this issue.
The rules suggested include a limit on lending to non-banking  activities as
a percentage of bank capital such that if credit is extended beyond that limit
it should be deducted from bank capital.  However,  in many emerging
economies the problems regarding related lending have been so acute that
such lending is actually forbidden altogether or much stricter limits already
apply.  On this issue, from the standpoint of emerging economies,  the
proposals from BCBS are not strict enough.
' The previous version of this paper called  for a postponement  in the original 2004 deadline  for these
motives.
6Regarding  capital requirements,  as discussed  above, the new proposals
include three alternatives:  (1)  a standardized approach,  (2)  a 'foundation'
internal ratings approach and (3) an advanced internal ratings approach.
The standardized approach'
Under the standardised approach  one of'the main innovations relative to the
1988 Accord is the use of external ratings agencies to set the risk weights
for corporate,  bank and sovereign claims.
More specifically,  the new proposals include tables defining 'buckets'  of
ratings for corporate  and for sovereign  credits to translate a particular rating
into a risk weight.  Table  1 illustrates the basic approach.  The approach is
most clear for corporates.  For sovereigns,  there are slightly different
buckets in the basic approach but there are also some special rules that
apply.
For examnple,  at national discretion, there is a special rule for claims on the
sovereign of the country where the bank is incorporated where the claim is
denominated in the currency of  the sovereign and also funded in that
currency (i.e.:  loans to sovereigns funded and lent in the domestic
currency).  At first sight this allows baniks in emerging  countries to lend to
their governments (or hold bonds in an investment account) with a zero or
low capital charge.  However, in many emerging countries such loans and
bonds are often expressed in dollars or other non-local currencies,  and
these would not then attract this special treatment.  In this case,  credit
extended to a government of an emerging country would attract the capital
.9 charge given the rating of the sovereign9.
The rules for claims on banks are slightly more complex than those of
corporates.  One alternative allows banks to be rated one notch worse (i.e.:
one risk weight category higher) than the sovereign but with a cap  at a risk
8 At the time of writing informally the BCBS have let it be known that a simplified version of the
standardized approach may be developed  for publication in late 2001  particularly  with low income
developing countries  in mind.
9  It is not entirely clear what the treatment would be in Ecuador,  El Salvador or Panama (3 dollarized
countries) or for that matter for the countries of EMU  If the special treatment exists because  the 'credit
risk' of a local currency  claim will, in general,  be less than that of a foreign currency claim when there  is
a devaluation  or sharp depreciation of the local currency then this suggests the special treatment  should
not be extended to dollarized countries or members of EMU and this takes  as a given that any currency
risk mismatch is treated  in an appropriate manner separately.  The  view that local currency claims  are
different because  of the existence of a lender of last resort appears to confuse  'credit risk' with liquidity
considerations and suggests that banks'  capital requirements  should explicitly reflect  the fact that
governments would deflate away debts that goes against  any credible  commitment to, say,  an inflation
target.weight of 100% (except for banks incorporated in countries with a rating
lower than B- where the risk weight is 150%).
Table 1:  Risk Weights Given  External Credit Ratings
Basel  Committee  on Banking Supervision
January 2001
AAA  to  A+  to  BBB+  to  BB+  to  Below  Unrated
AA-  A-  BBB-  B-  B-
Sovereign  0%  20%  50%  100%  150%  100%
Bank
Alternative 2'  20%  50%  100%  100%  150%  100%
Bank
Alternative 2b  20%  20%  20%  50%  150%  20%
AAA  to  A+  to  BBB+  to  Below  Unrated
AA-  A-  BB-  BB-
Corporate  20%  50%  100%  150%  100%
a: refers to rating of sovereign
b: refers to rating of bank -for loans of less than 3  months,  lent and funded  in domestic currency.
A second alternative  allows for a risk weighting that is one notch better
than that of the bank itself (i.e.: one risk weight category less) but this
alternative is only for claims of less than 3 months original maturity and
does not apply to banks rated below B- that then have a  150% risk weight.
Where the national authority has applied the special rule mentioned above
for claims on sovereigns in domestic currency ('clause 24'), a special rule
can also be applied to short-term (less than 3 months) claims on banks
denominated and funded in domestic  currency.  In this case,  the proposal
allows for a rating that is one notch worse (i.e.:  one category of risk
weighting higher) than that of the sovereign of incorporation itself (subject
to a 20% floor).
The ratings for corporates and for banks are not subject to a sovereign floor
as under the original proposals (i.e.: the first set of proposals for the new
Accord) of June  1999, allowing  for claims on corporates in some countries
to have lower capital requirements than a claim on the sovereign itself
8Standard and Poor's and Fitch both have some corporates rated higher than
their respective sovereigns - Moody's does not".
A second significant  innovation in the standardised approach is the change
and increased sophistication of the rules on credit mitigation techniques
and in particular the rules on the use of collateral.  These  appear to be a
significant advance over the 1988 Accord.  I do not go into detail in this
paper on these changes.
The Internal Ratings Based Approach: a very selective  introduction
Under the internal rating approach banks may employ their own opinions
regarding borrowers in setting capital requirements.  More specifically,
there are a set of basic parameters that banks may estimate and then feed
into a formula to determine  actual risk weights.  Two crucial  parameters
required are the Probability of Default (PD) and the Loss Given Default
(LGD).  Box lincludes some of the details of the fonnula involved.
Two alternative approaches  are proposed (1) a foundation and (2) an
advanced approach.  Under the foundation  approach banks determine  the
probability of default and all other parameters  are essentially set by
supervisory rules.  Under the advanced  approach,  banks may also
determine the Loss Given Default (LGD).  Other parameters  also important
for the calculation of the actual risk weight,  including in some cases the
Maturity of the Transaction (M) and the Exposure At Default (EAD) are
determined by supervisory rules under both alternatives.
The proposals reflect the significant advances in credit risk measurement in
some G1O private sector banks, central banks and other supervisors and
academia.  The proposals translate the estimates of the parameters listed
above to a particular risk weight via specified formulae.  These formulae
may be thought of as approximations to the results  from more complex
models.  The calibration employed attempts to ensure that the capital
required, for an individual loan, is broadly consistent with the capital
required, for a 'standard'  loan in a well-diversified portfolio,  stemming
from one of these more complex models".
'° It is the understanding  of the author that Moody's  is currently seeking to revise  this rule.
i i We are informed  in the text that the formulae are  consistent with Riskmetrics'  "  Creditmetrics"  program
and a reasonable estimation to CSFB's "Creditrisk±"  program.  However,  for those  'not in the know',  the
precise  calibration  and scaling process is not fully explained.  The interested reader may wish to consult
Carey (2000),  Crouhy,  Galai and and Mark (2000) and Gordy (2000)  for an analysis of different  credit
risk models and Jackson  and Perraudin  (2000) on 'back-testing'  and hence calibration  and regulatory
implications.
9The proposals make explicit that required capital  is calibrated such that it
covers both the expected and unexpected  loss stemming from a potential
loan (the expected loss plus the unanticipated  loss is frequently referred to
as the Value at Risk).  The unexpected loss is defined with respect to a
probability tolerance value (taken to be 99.5%).  Adjustments are then
made to the requirement given the maturity of the actual loan and the
presence of any collateral.  A 'granularity'  adjustment is then made for all
non-retail lending in an attempt to approximate the results of a portfolio
model of credit risk.
Box  1: Some of the Mathematics  of the Intemnal Ratings'  Approach
There are two crucial  formulae to calculate the risk weight for a loan with probability of default
(PD) and loss given default (LGD):
BRWc(PD)=976.5*N(1.118*G(PD)+1.288)*(1+0.0470*(  iPD))  (1)
Equation 1 yields a benchmark corporate risk weight BRWc where N(x) is the cumulative normal
distribution function and G(x) is the inverse cumulative normal distribution function.  The intuition
behind the formula is explained as follows:
*  the first term N(i.I 18... ) represents the sum of expected and unexpected  losses for a 1 year loan
with LGD of 100% following a Merton-style risky debt model, lognormal credit nrsk and subject to
a 99.5% tolerance value (VaR) within a hypothetical  infinitely granular  portfolio with an average
correlation between assets of 0.2.
* the second term (1+0.470 ... ) is an adjustment  such that BRWC  is calibrated  for a 3-year maturity
(whereas the PD's are for I year).
* 976.5 is a scaling factor such that a loan with PD=0.7 and LGD=50% has a risk weight of 100%.
RW,  =Min  LGD *BRwK(PD),12.5*LGD}  (2)
Where RW0 is  the corporate risk weight.  The cap implied by this expression  assures that setting
aside capital given the risk weight is never worse than deducting the actual exposure from capital.
10A counter proposal  is that provisions should reflect expected losses while
capital  should reflect only unanticipated  losses subject to the tolerance
value.  The rationale for the proposals as they stand appears to be that
general provisioning in most countries (and under the curTent Accord)  can
be counted towards regulatory capital  and specific provisioning on
particular loans is normally determined by accountancy  concepts of ex post
loss rather than related to the economic concept of expected future loss.
Moreover,  there is no international  agreement on how to set provisioning
requirements.  Hence,  the proposal  to calibrate capital  to the expected loss
plus the unexpected loss is clearly a conservative approach and for most
G1O  countries only risks minor double counting.
However, from the standpoint of emerging countries this issue may be
more important.  In Latin America provisioning requirements tend to be
high and in some countries are specifically thought of in tenns of covering
expected loss (in Latin  America provisions  as a percentage  of gross
financing is around 8%).  Moreover,  in some Latin American  countries
provisioning requirements  stem from highly developed credit bureau
policies.  I come back to this point below.
It is clear from the proposals that the focus to date for internal ratings has
been based on corporate and to some extent on retail lending.  Indeed, in
the consultative document dedicated  to The Intemal Ratings-Based
Approach  some 65 pages are devoted to the methodology for rating
corporates while only 3 pages and 4 lines is devoted to intemal ratings for
sovereigns (and 2 pages devoted to banks).  While this comparison may be
unfair in that the pages on the corporate approach explain many more
general aspects,  it is nevertheless  striking the apparent lack of independent
analysis of sovereign  exposure under thie IRB proposals.  The reader is left
with the suspicion that the proportion of attention devoted to the analysis of
the risks in lending to sub-investment  grade sovereigns may be closely
related to the proportion of such lending on GIO internationally  active bank
portfolios.
In the introduction to the chapter devoted to internal ratings for sovereigns
it is stated that most banks rely substantially on external ratings  and that
internal-rating  systems for sovereigns are in general not very well
developed.  At the same time the proposals make clear that banks with
material exposure to a sovereign should not simply rely on external ratings
but should have their own independent  capability of analysis for sovereign
risk and should augment the information provided extemal rating agencies
with their own independent analysis.The proposals dictate a set of minimum requirements  for banks that wish to
use the internal ratings'  approach.  These minimum requirements  differ
slightly between the different portfolios (corporates, retail, banks and
sovereign) but are in fact variations on the minimum requirements for
corporates.  Hence I devote the discussion to this part of the overall
portfolio.
The minimum requirements for the Foundation approach are  listed under 9
headings; (1) meaningful differentiation  of credit risk,  (2) completeness
and integrity of rating system,  (3) oversight of rating system and processes,
(4) criteria of rating system,  (5) estimation of  the probability of default
(PD),  (6) data collection and IT systems,  (7) use of internal ratings,  (8)
internal validation and (9) disclosure (which make up part of Pillar 3 -
Market Discipline).  For the advanced approach,  the to these requirements
are also added requirements  for Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at
Default (EAD) estimation and additional requirements to factor in the use
of guarantees  and credit derivatives.
Here I focus on the central issue of PD estimation.  One year PD estimates
form the basis of the internal ratings approach although the proposals are
careful to point out that such one-year  estimates should be thought of as a
conservative view of long run PD's.  The implication  is that the PD
estimate should be the maximum of the currently estimated one-year PD
and the long run  'through the cycle'  PD for each borrower.  The proposals
indicate that banks will be expected to use more than one source of data for
their PD estimates including  (1) internal  default experience,  (2) mapping to
external data and (3) statistical default models.  The proposals are careful to
point out that there will be many judgmental  decisions that will be required
to arrive at particular  PD estimates.  In an attempt to limit the errors from
such processes, the proposals lay down that:
a.  The population of borrowers represented in the data set used
should be comparable to the data set on each required
portfolio.
b.  The lending standards used to generate the exposures  should
be comparable to those used by the bank.
c.  The economic or market conditions under which the historical
experience took place should be relevant.
d.  The number of loans and sample period should be sufficient to
provide robust statistical estimates.
12Irrespective  of the data source(s)  employed,  the proposal states that the
minimum historical period for the data employed should be 5 years and that
this should be very much seen  as a minimum.
The internal rating approach  is essentially based on the current practice of
large G1O private  banks.  The survey evidence of current methodologies
has been translated  into a set of best practices and these best practices have
been laid down as a set of minimum standards.  Having said that, the focus
has not been to fix one particular methodology but rather to attempt to lay
down general principals, which any appropriate methodology should
follow.  I argue below that this approach may be very appropriate  for the
set of large private internationally active banks that have been developing
such methodologies over recent years,  and hence the standard may well be
an appropriate one for those banks in CJiO  countries.  Many emerging
countries, however,  will find these new proposals on internal ratings
extremely difficult to implement  and will consider that the laid down
requirements  do not fit well the kinds of methodologies  that they have been
following in other areas, for example to set provisioning requirements.
3.  The new  Basel Capital Accord  and the Cost of Capital for
Emerging Economies
In this section we review the proposals for the revision of the  1988 Capital
Accord and how this is likely to affect the cost of capital to emerging
economies.  We note that the BCBS claims that the new proposals
(specifically the standardized approach) will be neutral in termns of the
overall  capital requirement for banks while adopting an Internal Ratings
(IRB) approach should carry with it some incentives in terrns of reduction
in capital charges.  This does not of course mean that it will be neutral for
one particular class of lending  (e.g.:  sovereign lending)  or a particular  sub-
class (e.g.:  lending to emerging  economies).  In this section I discuss first
the use of the standardized approach  and then the IRB approach and their
respective implications for the cost of capital for emerging economies.
3.a The standardised or IRB approaches for sovereign  risk ?
In this subsection,  I assume that there is value in attempting to link capital
requirements more closely with the riskiness of particular loans (see Milne
2001 for an alternative view).  Hence the question addressed here is not
whether but rather, how, with particular reference  to sovereign risk.  I focus
on a set of particular issues that have been raised.
13External ratings and pro-cyclicality
First, it has been noted that ratings are pro-cyclical  and may also follow
rather than lead country (and market) developments.  The argument goes
that this may then lead to an exacerbation of economic  cycles as during a
downturn  a country's cost of capital may rise.
However, having said that it is difficult to argue that in the absence of such
rules bank lending will not be pro-cyclical.  Indeed, regulatory
requirements must always be considered as minimum requirements  and it is
likely that lending institutions will adopt a more conservative  position than
the minimum requirements during a downturn and will either restrict credit
or increase the cost of credit or both independently of the current constant
minimum requirement.  Some GIO countries today also have
complementary provisioning rules for their banks lending to emerging
economies and these are already pro-cyclical  in nature.  Hence,  although
the introduction of the use of external credit ratings will almost certainly
introduce pro-cyclicality in minimum requirements  it is less obvious
whether this will introduce any greater pro-cyclicality  in actual bank capital
and reserve policies.
Indeed, the proposed change may be more significant to the cost of credit
during the good times rather than the bad times.  In other words it may
reduce the effective cost of credit during the good  timnes where competition
between lenders is likely to be strongest exacerbating  'over-lending'.
Where I share the view of those who stress is pro-cyclicality as an
important theme is in the boom.  It is then that capital and provisions
should be raised and hence might then subsequently be reduced when the
bubble bursts.  If the recession has already begun and requirements were
not increased during the good-times,  it is most likely to be dangerous to
advocate reducing them.
Circularity and just getting it wrong!
However,  the use of external ratings raises other issues apart from pro-
cyclicality.  It is notable that in the explanations of certain downgrades,
rating agencies have cited reduced market access as one factor explaining a
downgrade decision.  If capital requirements  and the cost of lending to a
particular country depend on a country's rating and this depends on market
access, then there is a potential circularity,  not just pro-cyclicality.
14Moreover, the rating  industry is a highly concentrated  one and arguably
there are very strong economies of scale in information gathering.  There
has also been a notable increase in concentration recently12. This does not
necessarily lead to a lack of competition between agencies but it does
imply that there are very few (independent)  opinions  on what the risk of a
sovereign actually is from this source.  At the same time,  the analysis of
sovereign risk is a very subjective issue with political risk being one of the
most important factors and yet very  difficult to model and quantify and the
weights of different risk factors in the overall level of risk being quite
controversial.
The combination of few opinions and a highly subjective  analysis leads
inevitability to a higher probability of wrong  answers - categorising
countries as riskier than they actually are or vice versa.  An incorrect rating
could, depending on country characteristics have substantial  effects on the
cost of capital.  For although, to some extent, the risk rating buckets might
reduce this problem,  these buckets also imply that there are cliff faces  and
if a country is rated incorrectly at the top of one bucket and not at the
bottom of the next category, this could lead to substantial costs especially if
this provokes some type of vicious cycle'3.
Or a rat(ing) race to the bottom  ?
In this discussion I have implicitly  assumed that G1O  countries will only
allow ratings from one of the few 'big'  and 'credible'  credit rating firms.
Another concern is that this will not be the case and that there will be a
more liberal interpretation of the rules regarding which credit rating
agencies banks'  will be allowed to use - which is at national discretion but
subject to a set of minimum laid down  'eligibility criteria' 
14. However, this
brings its own concerns,  namely that there may be a race to provide
'convenient'  ratings or in other words a race to the bottom in terms of the
quality of the rating which even the 'big'  agencies might then find it
difficult to resist for competitive reasons 5.
12 The rating agency Fitch was created out of the original Fitch, IBCA, Thompson and Duff and Phelps.
Standard and Poor's and Moody's have expanded substantially intemationally and in the process have
forged alliances or taken over local rating agencies  in several  countries.
13 In faimess the document itself notes that the use of external rating agencies is problematic  and that
rating agencies  do not have an untainted record.  'Fhe defence  of the approach  is that it is an advance  over
the current 'OECD'  rule.  However, this does not mean that it is the best feasible approach  available.  I
return to this point when we consider  the use of internal ratings.
14 Eligibility criteria include objectivity,  independence,  intemational access/transparency,  disclosure,
resources and credibility.
15 This concem has been highlighted by the Latin American  Shadow Regulatory Committee  (see
Statement No 2, 30/4/2001,  Caracas, Venezuela).
15Export Credit Agencies:  a solution  ?
The new proposals also allow for the use of export credit agency (ECA)
ratings to be used by banks instead  of ratings from private rating agencies.
Again, the use of this different type of 'ratings' is subject to minimum laid
down requirements including that such ratings must follow an agreed
OECD procedure and that they must be published.  To some extent this
idea addresses the concerns above but only partially and also it raises its
own issues.  On the one hand, given that currently there are very few
eligible ECA ratings available that meet the laid down criteria it does not
change substantially  the points made regarding the concentration of the
industry.  And even if there were more, given that they must follow a
common methodology,  it is not clear whether there is a very significant
gain in terms of an increase in the number of independent opinions
available.  On the other hand, while such 'official'  ratings may avoid the
competitive pressures on private rating companies, these ratings may suffer
from other pressures.
The proposal is much less problematic when it comes to the use of
corporate ratings.  Rating a corporate is a less subjective art and hence the
standard deviation attached to any risk rating for a corporate  is likely to be
much lower than the corresponding  measure for a sovereign rating.
The IRB approach for sovereign  and external ratings
for corporate ?
There is also an economic efficiency argument in favour of the use of
external ratings for corporates that does not necessarily carry over to
sovereigns.  There are many corporates in the world and there are many
banks lending to those corporates.  The number of sovereigns is much
lower in number and hence, the economies in 'contracting out' the rating
process in this case is much lower.  The document is very careful to point
out that any bank that has a 'material exposure'  to a sovereign should have
its own capability to independently assess the relevant risk even if it is
using an external rating approach to fix capital requirements.  This raises
the question that if such an independent opinion is required anyway,
perhaps an internal rating should be required for any bank that has a
material exposure'.
The proposals reference survey evidence that most international banks rely
heavily on external ratings for their own internal sovereign credit analysis
and it is suggested  that this might be because banks have little additional
information with respect to sovereigns (implicitly it is suggested that a
16bank may have superior information on a corporate borrower).  However,
an altemative view is that sovereigns are  simply very difficult to 'rate'
whether the rating is done by a bank or by an external rating agency and
that banks rely more on external rating agencies  for sovereign  exposures
simply because there is no agreement on the correct methodology.  If this
argument is correct and sovereigns  are very difficult to rate, due to the high
degree of subjectivity involved, it follows that it is even more important to
develop  and employ internal bank rating  systems for sovereigns  and
generate more independent  opinions, rather than to rely on the opinions of
very few external-rating  agencies.
An important  consideration in this debate is whether banks' internal ratings
are more or less pro-cyclical  than those of rating agencies.  The BCBS
claims implicitly that banks' ratings  are likely to be more cyclical in that
while rating agencies claim that they tend to adopt a 'through the cycle
approach'  (i.e.: not taking into account the current economic  conditions
that might be attributed to the cycle).  Currently, banks'  ratings typically
reflect a 'point in time'  approach and indeed survey evidence  suggests that
the point in time may be as little as one year out.  The proposal however
suggests that PD estimates should 'represent a conservative  view of long-
run averages'  which sounds more akin to the  'through the cycle approach'.
On the other hand there is strong statistical  evidence of serial correlation in
rating agencies'  sovereign ratings.  While this might be explained by other
properties,  this might suggest that rating agencies are more influenced by
the 'cycle' than they admit'6*
This suggests a trade-off.  While the use of internal ratings may imply
greater pro-cyclicality in requirements  (although not necessarily in capital),
the use of  internal ratings may generate more independent opinions
regarding actual credit risk.  In turn this may lower the risk of a systemic
error between the general level of banks'  requirements and the actual risk
of a sovereign.
These arguments raise a further issue in that the proposal suggests that if a
bank employs a internal rating approach for one class of exposures  (say
sovereign),  it should move 'aggressively'  to  an internal rating approach  on
all exposures.  The justification for this is to attempt to curb 'cherry
picking'  between an internal rating and an external rating.  However, given
the arguments presented here, assessing a sovereign may be quite different
to assessing a corporate  and it appears that using internal ratings for
sovereigns (where there is material exposure)  and external ratings for
16 See Cruces (2001)  for a discussion.
17corporates should be thought of as a perfectly reasonable  equilibrium
position.
3.B Estimating the effect of the new standard on bank capital
requirements
Much of the discussion to date has centred on the use of the standardized
approach for the ratings of sovereigns.  However,  we show below that if the
standardized approach is adopted for sovereigns then this, by itself, will
tend to reduce the minimum capital requirements  for developing countries
especially those that have the better ratings.  On the other hand we estimate
that the IRB approach will increase capital requirements for BIS reporting
banks lending to developing countries and substantially  so for lower rated
countries.
To fix ideas, in Graph  1 we plot the capital requirements  for the current
rules, for the standardized approach and for an IRB approach for different
ratings1 7. The figures in the body of the graph are the assumed
probabilities of default (PDs) for each ratings grade as taken from Jackson
(2001) but adapted for sovereign risk which implies that capital
requirements for a rating of A and above are set to zero.  The other PDs are
exactly as those following the assumption that the PD of a sovereign is the
same as the PD of a corporate of equal rating (following the proposals).
The relevant PD's are converted to a capital requirement following the
formulae presented in Box 1 above and assuming a Loss Given Default of
50% and a maturity of 3 years and no 'granularity'  adjustment (Jackson
2001  also provides these capital requirements).
7We use the phrase 'an IRB'  approach as the implied  assumptions here include that 1. banks agree with
the mapping of the rating to a particular PD and 2. Loss Given Default is 500/n and Exposure at Default
estimates is I 00/o.  Naturally varying these parameters  will give different results.
18Graph 1
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The shape of the relevant curves gives the game away immediately.  Given
the default probabilities,  the relationship between rating and capital
requirement for the IRB approach  is highly convex.  While at high ratings
the IRB approach gives lower capital requirements,  at higher capital
requirements the IRB approach can give very significantly increased capital
requirements.  Lending to a BB rated sovereign (e.g.:  India and Colombia -
Brazil is BB-) would imply a raised minimum capital requirement from 8%
to  12.5% and for a B rated sovereign (e.g.: Argentina - Indonesia and
Russia are B-) to over 30%.  Ecuador, which is CCC, would attract a
capital requirement of  47%18.
18 We note as an aside that the implementation of this approach may have significant implications  for
multilateral guarantee  programs.  In particular, a World Bank (AAA) partial  guarantee for a lower rated
sovereign would have significantly  higher  'leverage'  in a world where private lenders  set capital
according to the IRB approach as explained  above relative to one where capital or other reserves did not
differentiate  between default probabilities.  Of course,  the attractiveness  of the guarantee would
nevertheless  depend on the pricing policy of the World Bank and critically whether the World Bank
differentiates  between 'client countries'  on the basis of estimated  default probabilities.  If the World Bank
19The standardized  approach also clearly introduces a relationship between
the capital requirement  and risk but as compared to the IRB approach the
slope is fairly gentle.  This sets up some potentially perverse incentives
among banks'9. In particular, the more sophisticated banks that employ the
IRB approach will have incentives to shed the higher risk credits off their
balance  sheets while the less sophisticated banks will have the incentive to
take on those risks.  Hence, the relative slopes of the standardized IRB
approaches may imply risky clients with less sophisticated banks and less
risky ones with more sophisticated  lenders - a somewhat perverse result.
However,  it should be noted that it is to be expected that most large,
internationally  active US and European banks will, over time, be expected
to adopt the IRB approach  so the 'arbitrage'  will most likely be not
between this group of banks.  Smaller European and US banks do not tend
to lend large amounts to emerging economies,  so the magnitude of the
problem may be smaller than first imagined.  Where there may still exist an
arbitrage is across the banks of different countries.  For example, if Brazil's
regulators allow only the standardized  approach for Brazilian banks, then it
is likely that Brazilian corporates with international ratings lower than say
BBB, and certainly of B and lower,  will find credit from European and US
banks significantly more expensive and will thus presumably tend to find
more and more credit domestically.
did not differentiate between 'client countries'  according to estimnated default probabilities as much as the
schedule indicated above (and clearly if it did not discriminate  at all on that basis), then it would follow
that World Bank guarantees  will become much more attractive instruments  for client countries attempting
to obtain funding from such regulated institutions.
'9 I am indebted to comments from Hyun Shin and others highlighting  this point.
20Graph 2
Estimated  Effects on  Interest Rates
(assumes funding cost of 5%  and required  return on equity of 18%)
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The capital requirements graphed above can be quickly converted into an
estimated change in lending spreads assuming  a current treatment of 8%
capital charge, a competitive  loan market and a particular required return
on equity and assumed cost of other funds.  Graph 3 plots the effect on
spreads as a function of the rating for both the standardized and this IRB
approach.  Thus,  assuming a required return on equity of 18%  and a cost of
other funds of 5%, India and Colombia (BB) would face an increase in
spreads of about 57 basis points and Argentina (B) an increase of about 320
basis points.  Naturally other assumptions would give different results2 0.
20 Reisen (2001)  and Griffith Jones and Spratt (2001)  in similar analyses claim much larger effects on
spreads (larger by an order of 10 roughly speaking).  It appears that these authors calculate required
returns on equities using market spreads for borrowers of different ratings in a so-called RAROC (risk
adjusted return on capital) calculation - see also Deutsche Bank (2001).  This approach would give,  for
example,  a required return on equity of 75% for a sovereign  trading currently at 600 basis points over a
US treasury assuming that the US treasury rate was also the appropriate cost of funding for  the institution
in question.  While such required retums on equity appear unrealistic (and do not concord with those
informally reported to the author by several  intemational  banks operating in emerging economies),  this
21However, these estimates assume that all lending to developing countries
takes the form of loans to the sovereign,  which is clearly not the case.  In
order to understand better the potential increase  in the cost of funds to
developing countries more generally we need to consider the composition
of lending (sovereign versus bank versus corporate).  This is a more
complex task and while comparative data sources have improved
considerably,  here, we proceed with some assumptions.
We employ a combination of the joint BIS/OECD/World Bank/IMF
database on external debt and the BIS's own data and Standard and Poor's
ratings for the standardized approach and also for the IRB approach
together with the mapping described already above between ratings and
PD's2l.  In other words the assumption is that banks think that the S&P
ratings are correct and that the mapping produced by Jackson (2001)  is also
correct.  We use the BIS consolidated data as the best approximation to the
exposure of  BIS reporting banks to a set of countries22.
We  consider  claims  on  sovereigns  and  claims  on  banks  - implicitly
assuming  that  claims  on  corporates  are  at  the  same  capital  requirement
levels  as  lending  to  the  sovereign  (this  most certainly  underestimates  the
effects  especially  for  the  IRB  approach).  For  banks  we  take  capital
requirements  to  be  one  'bucket'  worse  than  the  sovereign  both  for  the
standardized  and the IRB approach  where our buckets for the IRB approach
are AAA,  AA,  A,  BBB, BB,  B and  CCC  (in other words we  assume that
for  sovereigns  that  are  say BBB,  that country's  banks  are then  rated  BB
etc).  This implies the use of option  1  under the standardized  approach.
We also  attempt to take into  account the significant  tightening in the rules
on the preferential  treatrnent  of short tenn lending  to banks.  We consider
those liabilities  of less than  one year and assume that all of that proportion
of liabilities  on  developing  countries'  banks  currently  attract  a  capital
requirement of 20% of the minimum 8%  i.e.:  1.6%.  However,  in the new
proposals we assume that no lending to developing country banks from BIS
reporting  banks  will  attract  the  new  preferential  treatments.  While  this
overestimate  to some  degree the  effect of this tightening,  we do  not think
that this is very far off the mark as those loans that are made to developing
approach  does serve to remind us that market spreads for sovereigns tend to exceed dramatically the
market spreads  for  similarly rated corporates in the US or in other GI 0 countries.
21 The ratings are available on www-standardandpoors.com.
22  The BIS consolidated data has some particular features and includes,  for example, dollar exposure in
emerging economies when funding is local which might not be considered  by some as cross-border.
22countTy banks from BIS reporting banks in the currency  of the developing
country and funded in that currency must be very small indeed.
We  attempt  to  include  all  developing  countries  that we  have  both  rating
information from  Standard and Poor's and information  from both the joint
database  and the BIS (this  is then our definition  of 'developing',  although
we tend to exclude offshore centres).
There  are  two  special  cases  that  deserve  special  mention  (Korea  and
Mexico)  who  are  both  included  in  the joint  database  but  who  are  also
OECD members.  Both  will move,  under the  new proposals,  from  a zero
risk weight to a positive one corresponding  to their respective  rating.  In the
case of S&P, the Mexico  rating is currently  BB+,  at the top of one of the
rating  buckets,  although  we  note  that  this  may  well  change  before  the
implementation  of these  proposals  in  2005  (moreover  Moody's  currently
has Mexico rated at a higher equivalent grade).
23Table 2
Estimated  Effects on Capital  Requirements and Spreads
For BIS Reporting  Banks Lending to Developing Countries
Rating  Number of  BIS Consolidated  Change in Cap. Requirements  Change in Spread
Countries  Uabilties  Standardized  IRB  Standardized  IRB
$bn  $bn  $bn  bpts  bpts
AAA  1  100.1  -4.1  -4.4  -53.3  -57.4
AA  1  28.5  -2.1  -2.1  -96.6  -97.4
A  11  193.6  -8.1  -10.3  -54.3  -69.3
BBB  16  186.3  -24  0.5  -16.8  3.3
BB  14  178.6  0.9  15.0  6.7  111.1
B  17  228.2  1.7  62.9  10.6  383.7
CCC  1  1.6  0.1  0.6  68.3  604.2
Unrated (UR)  96  111.5  1.6  1.6  20.2  20.2
Total  157  1028.4  -12.4  63.8  -16.0  82.7
Excl. UR  61  916.9  -14.0  62.2  -20.2  90.0
Belaw BBB  32  408.4  2.7  78.6  9.0  261.6
Korea (BBB)  1  58.8  3.4  4.7  74.8  104.8
Mexico (BB+)  1  63.7  5.0  9.4  104.5  194.9
Total  159  1150.9  -4.0  77.9  -4.6  90.2
Excl. UR  63  1039.4  -5.6  76.3  -7.1  97.3
BelowBBB  33  530.9  11.1  92.7  28.3  235.4
Table 2 gives estimates of the effect on capital requirements  and spreads
given the assumptions made above with countries grouped according  to
rating category (here we assume for example that A+, A and A- are all in
the same IRB default probability grading)  3.  As is to be expected there are
reductions in capital requirements for highly rated borrowers and increases
for less well rated borrowers.  Singapore (the country with a AAA in our
sample), obtains an estimated $4bn+ reduction in capital requirements
23  Suppose that Rk is the cost of equity, Rf is funding cost and dK is the % change in the capital
requirement (i.e.: as a percentage of the original capital requirement),  kO is the original capital
requirement  as a percentage of total claims  and d is the probability of default then the calculated change
in the spread is simply (Rk-Rf)*dK*kO/(l-d).
24(somewhat over  80% of current requirements)  and an estimated reduction
in lending spreads overall of about 55  basis points (53  for the standardized
and 57 for the IRB approaches,  again assuming a cost of equity of 18% and
a cost of funds for BIS reporting banks of 5%).  We note that the reduction
in capital requirements is not 100% in our estimations only due to the effect
of the tightening of the rules on banks.  If all loans were to a AAA
sovereign  then the reduction would be  100% of current requirements.
On the other hand, for countries rated below BBB there are increases in
capital requirements.  For the standardized approach this results in
increases in requirements of about $ lbn for BB sovereigns  - about 7% of
current requirements)  and about $1.  7bn for B sovereigns-  about 11 %  of
requirements.  These increases are entirely  due to the tightened rules for
banking sector loans.  However,  we note that this is likely to be an
underestimate  as we are assuming that corporate lending is at the same
rating as the sovereign and we are also using the sovereign  scale (note that
in the standardized approach a B sovereign gets a capital requirement of
8% whereas a B corporate requires a capital requirement of 12%).
Moreover,  for the banking systems themselves this may imply a sharply
increased cost of funds (i.e.  dividing by the liabilities of the banking
sector and not the total liabilities of the country to BIS reporting banks).
Under the standardized approach Ecuador (CCC) would face an increase in
requirements of about $170,000  or almost 60%.  These increases translate
into estimated effects on the overall cost of capital of about 7 basis points
(BB),  11 basis points (B) and 68 basis points (Ecuador).
However, our focus here is on the IRB approach,  as this is likely to be
adopted in one form or another by most internationally  active banks.  Here,
capital requirements increase quite significantly for lower rated developing
countries.  On average we calculate that the increased capital requirements
for countries rated below BBB amounts to about $93bn on total liabilities
of those countries to BIS reporting banks of some $530bn.  Excluding
Mexico the relevant figures are about an $80bn on a stock of just over
$400bn.  For countries rated B the increase is some $63bn on a stock of
$228bn and for Ecuador there is a $0.6bn estimated increase on a stock of
$1 .6bn.
In Graph 3, we show the changes in estimated BIS reporting banks'  capital
requirements  for claims on emerging countries broken down by their 'risk
rating'.  The graph illustrates  the overall effect and the change in the
composition of the regulatory requirement across the different country risk
categories.  The standardized  approach results in a slightly reduced capital
requirement with the reductions in requirements  on the higher rated claims
25offsetting the increase in the lower ones while the IRB approach implies
significantly higher overall requirements  (from about $60bn to over
$120bn).  Moreover, it is clear considering the IRB approach how the
composition changes with countries  in the lower ratings categories -
particularly B and BB where there are substantial  claims - having
proportionally  higher requirements.
Graph 3
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Graph 4, summarizes these results from the point of spreads.  The
estimated increase in the cost of funds for those countries rated below BBB
is around 235 basis points.  Excluding Korea and Mexico this figure rises
to, on average,  to 260 basis points and those countries rated BB will face a
calculated 384 basis point increased funding cost and Ecuador  an increased
cost of funds of 600 basis points,  from BIS reporting  banks.
26Graph 4
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There are then fairly  significant potential effects on capital requirements
for BIS reporting banks'  loan books to developing countries and hence on
lending spreads.  Of course,  this is a natural consequence of a regime that
ties capital requirements more closely with risk and, for the IRB approach,
it is, to a large extent, a natural consequence of the mathematics of credit
risk.  Having said that, given that these effects  are significant, this does
raise concerns regarding the calibration.  In particular,  as discussed above,
the calibration was essentially  perfonrned employing the experience  of
corporate defaults.  A first question is that the exact details of the
calibration,  even for corporates,  is not actually known.  A second question
is whether this corporate calibration serves adequately for sovereigns too.
Here, due to lack of data we just simply do not know.  Given that the shape
of this curve implies substantial sensitivity  and potentially  quite serious
systemic effects for countries that might be 'rated'  say between BB and
CCC, the suggestion here is that there is a need for a deeper analysis of the
IRB approach particularly for sovereign risk.
27An alternative to the proposed IRB approach for sovereigns would be to
ask banks with a material exposure to sovereigns to make an internal rating
on a Moody's or S&P or Fitch type scale and then have the capital
requirement  determined by the much more gradual-sloped,  standardized
approach relation between rating and capital requirement.  Banks with
material exposures would be, as currently,  expected to substantiate their
ratings especially if they differed from those of the ratings agencies.  As
agencies themselves differ in the case of some countries,  such divergences
should not be considered necessarily  as abnormal.  Given the uncertainties
around the calibration of the IRB approach for sovereigns this might then
be a sensible comprormise.
4. On the implementation of the New  Accord  in emerging  countries
The focus of this section,  and the original motivation of this paper, is on
how an emerging country might implement this new Accord.  As discussed
above, supervisors will have a choice whether to implement the
standardized approach to set capital requirements or whether to allow their
regulated banks to employ one of the two internal ratings'  approaches.  As
detailed in section 1 the new Accord also includes proposals on two further
pillars (supervisory review and market discipline)  and there  are also
important issues regarding implementation regarding these other pillars.
However,  in this section the emphasis on Pillar 1 will be maintained.
The Standardized Approach
First consider the standardized approach to setting capital requirements.
Under the standardized approach risk weights for retail borrowers will
remain the same but external credit ratings are used to set risk weights for
corporate, bank and sovereign borrowers according to Table  I presented
above.  External  credit ratings may exist for many corporate  lenders in GIO
countries but as of today these are scarce commodities for emerging
country corporate borrowers24 . To some extent this may reflect the
industrial structure of many emerging economies and the relatively high
share of small and medium sized enterprises in some emerging economies
and/or it may also reflect the relatively low scale of development of local
capital markets.
To give an example,  in Argentina today, there are about 150 corporates that
have a rating.  However,  the credit bureau of the central bank has of the
24 It might be argued  that in many GI 0 countries  the universe of rated  claims is also highly limited.
28order of some 80,000 corporate  borrowers listed.  While it may be the case
that the  150 corporates  with ratings,  account for a higher percentage  of
credit, it is also the case that the real problems of credit risk measurement
do not lie in this sector25. Indeed,  in the case of Argentina,  the
implementation  of the standardized approach would lead to a substantial
reduction in the cost of credit for the currently rated corporates as those
companies with ratings tend to have high ratings.  This may be beneficial
for economic efficiency but at the same time may not be an advance in
terms of improving in any significant way the relation between  capital and
risk for the full spectrum of corporate borrowers.
It has been argued that the new proposals will give a stimulus to the credit
rating process and hence will have the effect of more corporates  obtaining  a
rating.  However,  it is doubtful that the incentives  will be such to make a
significant in road into the very significant number of small and medium
enterprises that borrow in emerging  economies.  Moreover,  given the
current and potential level of resources of the rating agencies,  if a
significant number of such companies quickly sought ratings, then there
would be grave doubts regarding the quality of those ratings26.
The conclusion  is then that the implementation of the standardized
approach - while bringing other benefits such as the treatment of collateral
- will leave most capital requirements  for emerging country borrowers
unchanged and will do little to enhance the relation between capital and
risk for emerging country banks.  In turn this means that, to a large extent,
the problems identified with the  1988 Accord will remain.
Internal Ratings
Now let us turn to the internal ratings approaches.  In these  approaches,
banks may use internal estimates of different parameters (Probability of
Default in the case if the foundation  approach and also including Loss
Given Default in the advanced approach) together with parameters obtained
by applying supervisory  rules (for Exposure  at Default and Maturity and
Granularity  adjustments) to obtain, via particular fonnulae,  a final risk
weight for each claim.  The formulae may be thought of as approximations
to required capital obtained from one of the recently  developed portfolio
credit risk models.
25  Indeed, note the relatively low sensitivity of capital requirements  to PD's at the low P'D part of the IRB
curve versus the high sensitivity  of the capital requirement  to PD at the high PD end of the IRB curve.
26  The concems of the Latin  American Shadow Financial  Regulatory Committee are also relevant here
(see footnote  13).
29It appears that the calibration  of these approaches has been effected through
consideration of the additional  risk of a typical corporate loan in a well-
diversified portfolio of GIO corporate loans.  Moreover, the calibration has
been such that required capital should cover both expected and unexpected
losses.  In thinking about how such methodologies might be applied in the
context of an emerging economy there are various issues that arise.  First,
the calibration essentially considers GlO corporate loans.  It is an obvious
point that this might not capture correctly the risks of even a corporate loan
book in an emerging  country where economic volatility is nonnally greater.
A slightly different but related point is that the systemic risk of a 'well
diversified'  loan book in the context of an emerging economy  is also
probably greater.  In other words, risks may be less 'diversifiable'  in an
emerging economy.  Another way to say this is that the correlation
structure is likely to be different with a higher positive  correlation between
default probabilities.
The same arguments of course stand thinking about the current (1988)
Accord.  And indeed many countries have adopted stricter standards (i.e.:
stricter than the 8% recommended minimum) presumably  because the
relevant authorities have thought that risks are greater.  A similar approach
could be suggested here such that the risk weights are derived using the
GI0 'calibration'  but then the risk weight is applied to a higher minimum
requirement (e.g.:  10%) rather than the 8% minimum.  However,  the
models underlying  the calibration are highly non-linear.  Given the (lack of)
degree of detail given regarding the actual calibration process,  it is at the
least, very unclear what such an approach would actually deliver.  At the
very least, this would require a significant  amount of work at the individual
emerging country level to attempt to translate the GI0 calibrations to one
that might be relevant.
A second issue is whether capital should cover simply unexpected losses or
both unexpected  and expected  losses.  On the one hand, given the lack of
international  agreement on provisioning rules, the actual treatment of
provisioning  in some GI 0 countries,  the fact that general provisions can
count as capital and the desire of the BCBS to err.  on the side of  being
conservative,  the proposals are understandable.  On the other hand,  some
emerging economies may be quite different to their GIO counterparts  in
this respect and the proposals as they stand may be quite problematic.
In the case of  many Latin American countries, for example,  supervisors
have much more freedom to set provisioning requirements than capital
30requirements  that are frequently  fixed under law27. This has been one of
the drivers for an increase the relative importance of provisions in the
region viz a viz capital.  Moreover,  in some countries,  provisions are
specifically thought of as covering expected losses.  In the case of
Argentina,  for example, there is a 1% general provision  on all new loans
(which counts as capital towards capital requirements)  but for the corporate
loan book (specifically  corporate loans above $200,000),  there may be
further provisions depending on a 'rating'  of each corporate  client.  These
ratings are supposed to be forward looking and based on cash flow
projections and income statements  and the like.  If capital covers both
unanticipated and anticipated losses,  then there is likely to be some double
counting.
Apart from the specifics regarding the analytical  aspects, there are also
likely to be serious issues regarding the implementation of an internal
ratings approach in an emerging economy.  The IRB approaches  allow
banks to estimate important parameters  that then feed into the
determination of their capital requirements.  This would be a significant
departure from current practice  and is half way towards the use of a more
general  'internal model'.  There are no assurances within the proposals
themselves that different banks have consistent parameter estimates e.g.:
that different banks have roughly the same PD or LGD estimates for the
same borrower or similar types of loans.  It is debatable whether such an
approach requires more or less supervisory resources but it is certainly true
that the nature of supervision changes  and that experienced supervisory
staff that also have a knowledge of the analytical issues will be heavily in
demand.  There  are likely to be very few emerging economy regulators that
first would contemplate giving such fieedom  to domestic banks currently
and, if they did, there would likely to be shortages of the type of
supervisory staff needed to implement such an approach with an
appropriate degree of supervisory  oversight28.
There are also a set of more specific issues regarding the implementation of
an IRB approach that may not 'fit' the context of an emerging  economy.
The minimum laid down requirements  for the rating process and for the
minimum amount of data required etc, have all been set with the current
practice of internationally  active GIO banks in mind.  It is quite likely that
the data requirements  and the rating process itself (e.g.:  the number of PD
grades) should be adapted for an emerging  country context.
27  We note that this is also a serious issue in itself as Pillar 2 calls for supervisors  to be independent and to
have powers to fix capital requirements independently of their political masters.
28  As an analogy,  the BCBS has allowed  the use of intemal models for market risk for  some time now.
To the author's knowledge there is not one emerging economy jurisdiction  that has 'approved'  the use of
an internal model.
315. Discussion  of the choices  facing emerging country regulators
Emerging country supervisors may then face a choice.  They may attempt
to implement an IRB approach as described in the proposals.  In this case
they will face several difficulties and,  as reviewed above, the calibration
may not be appropriate.  A sub-alternative  may be to attempt to adapt the
approach to the particular emerging country circumstances.  This is no
easy task, in part because the calibration methodology is not described in
sufficient depth to understand  how it should be changed.  One strong
reconmmendation  is that the BCBS  should publish much more detail
regarding the calibration methodology to allow regulators around the word
to adapt it to local conditions.
As stated above,  it is likely that, given the proposals as they stand, most
authorities will choose to implement the standardized  approach.  In that
case, due to the very limited universe of rated corporates,  very little will
change and the new proposals will not imply a significant  advance over the
1988 Accord.  From the standpoint of emerging economies,  this would be a
lost opportunity.  Put crudely, the new standard was not designed for
them2 .
At the same time, in many emerging  countries,  authorities have already
developed interesting policies - in part to control credit risk.  For example
in several Latin American countries,  credit bureau policies have been
developed.  Miller (2000) reviews Public Credit Registries (PCRs) in a
large number of countries30. These databases  in some cases cover a
significant number of loans and a significant fraction of the total credit
outstanding.  Indeed 9 countries in Latin America have such a bureau with
no minimum loan size implying that all loans must be reported.  In
addition,  Argentina has a policy that all loans above $50 should be
29 It has been commented to the author that this is also the case for many smaller, regional  G1O banks that
do not have many 'rated claims' on their balance sheet and that may not seek to get regulatory  approval
for an IRB  approach.  The implication of this comment is that the new standard was not designed for
these banks either but was then essentially  focussed on the large,  'intemationally  active'  banks.  This is of
course a perfectly valid focus for the BCBS to take but does suggest that the new standard mnay not have
universal application and that either 'new altematives'  could be included or failing that a new standard
could be developed  for other types of banks.
30  In addition, many countries have private credit bureaus (PCBs) that are highly  complementary  to these
Public Credit Registries.  In countries with relatively sophisticated PCBs, these frequently 'score out'
banks'  portfolios (especially  for consumer credit)  and indeed  the distribution of su8ch scores  may be used
to obtain an overall 'rating'  for the portfolio.  This is a common procedure  for example,  if a bank wishes
to securitise a particular  portfolio.  Presumably if a bank obtained an extemal credit rating for a particular
portfolio, it might then use that within the standardized  approach to seek a reduced capital requirement.  It
is not clear,  given the way the current proposals are written, whether or how much  a bank could  'contract
out'  its scoring or grading system and still be compliant with the laid down guidelines  of the IRB
approach.  This is an issue that the BCBA will no doubt need to consider in the months ahead.
32reported.  Typically,  (in 21 of the 30 such policies reviewed),  the data is
organized in a set of grades that might be likened to ratings.  In all but one
(Haiti), the  'rating'  is assigned  by the financial  institution although in many
cases this rating is then scrutinized by the regulatory authorities  and there
are generally cross controls (i.e.:  a consistency  check between  different
ratings of the same debtor).  Policies differ with respect to how many such
'ratings'  there are (typically  5 or 6) and how the methodologies for how
they are determined.
These policies were  developed,  on the one hand,  to share information
between  lenders, especially regarding bad credits,  and frequently to fix
appropriate levels of provisions.  However,  they obviously have very
significant potential uses for the measurement  of credit risk more generally.
In Falkenheim and Powell (2000), the authors develop  a simple model for
credit portfolio risk and use data from the credit bureau of the Argentine
central bank to calibrate it31.
This kind of approach opens up different possibilities.  Here I list three:
1. One possibility would be to develop a similar Internal Ratings type
methodology  as developed by the BCBS (i.e.:  a new set of Internal
Ratings developed by banks according to the BCBS minimum
requirements) but use the results from a local portfolio credit risk
model and local credit bureau infonnation to calibrate the
methodology to local circumstances.  This would have the advantage
for the authorities of not having to change the cuffent structure of the
relevant credit bureau and the local authorities  could claim that they
were implementing the new Accord but with 'improved' parameters.
A disadvantage  is that as discussed above this gives a degree of
freedom to banks to set critical parameters that then feed into
requirements that many emerging economy regulators may find
difficult to accept.  A second disadvantage  is the cost for the banks.
Not only would banks continue to be mandated to sent the relevant
data to the credit bureau but would also, if they wished to use
internal ratings, develop a different set of internal ratings following
the BCBS proposals (but with different calibration).
2.  A second possibility is then to attempt to harness the existing  credit
bureau policies in emerging countries and use those as a basis for the
31  Indeed the Argentine Central Bank has developed  a simple  scoring modcl  and  a credit portfolio  model,
based on Credit Suisse First Boston's Creditrisk+ program, to analyse credit  portfolio risk of banks and in
particular estimates of expected losses and unexpected  losses subject to dilfercnt  assumptions on crucial
parameters  and tolerance values.
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PD estimates  . This approach  is probably less costly from the point
of view of  the banks.  They would be able to use internal ratings for
capital, just as they are currently  used for provisioning,  and both
would work off the same set of information.  After all, if provisions
are already set to reflect expected loss, then estimating the
unanticipated loss is simply a different statistic but from the same
distribution.  This approach would also have the advantage  that
authorities would be able to supervise more effectively banks'
internal ratings.  The disadvantage of this approach is it would not
satisfy the minimum laid down requirements of the current BCBS
proposals.
3.  A third possibility is that the credit bureau policy in countries that
have developed these instruments is adapted such that it 'fits'  the
minimum laid down requirements of the BCBS proposals for
Internal Ratings.  This, depending on the country, would require  a
very significant  amount of investment from the part of the authorities
and on the part of the banks to adapt their systems from the current
ones to a new system consistent with the BCBS proposals.  Under
this proposal banks would have to follow similar methodologies to
set Internal Ratings but that methodology would aim to satisfy the
BCBS rules.  It would have the advantages then of simultaneously
satisfying the new proposals but also giving the regulators  a greater
degree of control over the rating methodology.  A disadvantage
would be cost.
Emerging country regulators will have to review these choices in the
coming months.  The urgency is that if authorities in emerging economies
wish to implement one of the Internal  Rating methodologies,  and the wish
to comply by the  1995 date, then they must start to plan now how such a
methodology would be implemented in order to start to obtain the
necessary time-series relevant of data.  However,  each of the three
alternatives has very significant  costs.  In the face of this situation, it is
likely that under the current proposals authorities in emerging countries
will opt for the standardized approach and that means very little change
from the 1988 Accord.
The Internal Rating approach as developed by the BCBS draws on the 'best
practice' of large banks in G1O countries.  This is of course not necessarily
32 Miller (2000) appears  somewhat critical of the rating information contained  in some PCRs.  To some
extent the debate is a little like the use of external  ratings discussed above.  The danger is that banks may
rely too much on publicly available 'ratings'  and do not develop their own independent opinions on
borrower  risks.  However, casual  evidence in Argentina is that the existence of the PCR has not stopped
the development  of private credit bureaus nor the development of banks'  own intemal scoring models.
34the 'best practice'  in emerging countries,  and in many  emerging countries,
authorities have been taking a quite different and more centralized
approach with the development of central PCRs.  Naturally,  each approach
has its pros and cons but at the very least a very  serious analysis is required
as to whether the new proposals  from the BCBS constitute the right
standard for emerging  economies.  If emerging countries adopt either the
standardized  approach or implement an Intemal  Rating approach
inappropriately calibrated,  then the conclusion must be that this was not the
right standard.
At the  same time, banks remain the most important financing source in
emerging economies.  The correct rules regarding  capital requirements and
the appropriate  supervision of those rules is then one of the most important
activities of emerging  country financial regulators and the decisions that
are made may have a macro-economic  impact.  It is then about time, that
serious consideration  is given to the idea of an appropriate  standard for
capital for emerging economy banks which may differ fromn the appropriate
standard for internationally  active banks of their GIO counterparts.  This
might then attempt to combine some of the advantages  of the IRB approach
(some  degree of autonomy for banks to set ratings and a better link between
risk and regulatory capital), but be more standardized than the current  IRB
proposals from the BCBS and draw on existing policies in.  emerging
economies.  This standard may then draw on the current  'best practices'  of
the regulatory  authorities in emerging  economies.
5. Conclusions
In this largely discursive  paper I have presented a review of the new
proposals from the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision to refonn the
1988 Capital Accord from the standpoint of emerging countries.  The  1988
Accord was a tremendous success and is probably the most successful of
all 'financial  standards'.  Although this Accord was designed by GIO
regulators,  and with internationally  active G 10 banks in mind, it has been
applied in many countries and for all banks.  The new proposals are
potentially  a very significant  step forward.  The discussion in this paper
centres on Pillar 1 i.e.: actual requirements  although the proposals
themselves  are much wider in scope.  The proposals include  a
'standardized'  approach  and also two Internal Rating  approaches.  Most
large,  internally active GIO banks will no doubt work towards
implementing  an Internal Rating approach that will link  credit risk more
closely with actual regulatory requirements.
35In an attempt to estimate the effects of the new proposals on the cost of
capital for emerging economies,  it is found that overall the level of
regulatory capital is reduced.  However,  for countries with poorer credit
ratings and the exceptional cases of Mexico,  Korea and Ecuador there are
sharp increases (although the case of Mexico  crucially depends on rating
movements in the coming years).  Moreover, in general there will be
significant increases in capital requirements  for GlO banks lending to
emerging economy banking  systems.
However, the real focus of this paper is to consider how emerging
economies might implement the new proposals domestically.  The
conclusion is that emerging economies face an unpalatable choice.  It is
likely that most emerging countries will implement the standardized
approach.  But, given the small universe of rated institutions  in emerging
economies, this is likely mean very little change on the current  situation.
Even with an optimistic growth rate of rated enterprises,  there will only be
marginal  effects and an 'optimistic'  growth rate of rated enterprises may
have as its counterpart a dilution in the quality of those ratings.  On the
other hand, emerging economies will face substantial difficulties
implementing one of the Internal Rating approaches and those approaches
have not been calibrated with emerging country risk in mind.  Moreover,
given the non-linearity of the models it is not at all obvious how increasing
the basic level of capital (from say 8% to 10%) corrects that problem.
Indeed,  emerging country authorities will need with some urgency a lot
more details on how the IR methodologies have been calibrated  to attempt
to make even broad guesses at a reasonable  'correction'.  The requirements
have also been calibrated using both anticipated and unanticipated losses
and in the case of some emerging economies,  there is then likely to be
serious double counting with respect to provisioning rules that also needs to
be taken into account.
More generally,  the laid down minimum requirements to arrive at Internal
Ratings, which may reflect the  'best practice'  among G10 internationally
active banks, may not be the right standards for an emerging  economy
authority to specify for domestic banks.  At the same time emerging
country supervisors have been moving in a different direction and many
have implemented significant Public Credit Registry policies in an attempt
to control credit risks more effectively.  This more centralized  approach has
its pros and cons viz a viz the more decentralized  approach of letting banks
design their own IR systems but subject to minimum criteria but the
revealed preference of emerging country supervisors is to move to this
more controlled type of IR and this tendency is also  clearly evident in, for
example, market risk regulation and supervision.
36This discussion raises the very serious issue as to whether the new
proposals  are the appropriate  standard for emerging economies and hence
whether they will be  as successful  as the  1988 Accord.  It is likely that
most emerging  countries will implement the standardized  approach in
which case little will change and the valuable work of the BCBS  in
developing the IR approaches  will be limited in the case of emerging
countries.  However,  banks remain the most important  source of finance in
such economies  and the correct measurement of credit risk is arguably even
more important than in the context of a GIO economy.  Hence,  it seems
appropriate to suggest that the time has come to think of a separate standard
for capital for emerging economy banks.  This standard might attempt to
employ the kinds of data that many emerging  country supervisors now have
available to them through typical (or adapted) credit bureau policies.
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